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On the 3rd December 2014, the Supreme Court closed the chapter on an ongoing 
family dispute concerned with a piece of land in Auckland; the dispute was between 
the ex wife and the widow against their sister in law.  The Supreme Court dismissed 
the ex-wife and widow’s application for leave to appeal, meaning that the ruling of 
the Court of Appeal remained in favour of Chrissie, the daughter of the will-maker, 
John Bethall.  The Supreme Court determined that the matter had been thoroughly 
examined by the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and that neither Court had erred 
in their interpretation of the deed in the context of the particular circumstances of the 
case. 
 
To understand the context of this dismissal of application for leave to appeal, we must 
look to the Court of Appeal judgment,1 given by Randerson J, in September 2014.  
The appeal concerned issues pertaining to, inter alia, equity, contract and succession.  
The appeal involved a disputed claim over 10 acres of land at Te Henga on 
Auckland’s west coast.  John Bethall had inherited several blocks of land, including 
the principle block.  John had 4 children: Margaret, Trudy, Ross and Christine 
(Chrissie).  John devised the principle block to Ross, but this was subject to Chrissie 
having the right, during her lifetime, to rent, at a nominal sum, approximately 10 
acres.  Further, there was provision that if a subdivision could be achieved, then 
Chrissie would be entitled to have that 10 acres transferred to her absolutely. 
Difficulties in interpreting John’s Will led to a Deed of family arrangement in 1987, 
and it was the interpretation of this that led to the appeal. 
 
Under the Deed, Ross agreed that Chrissie could call for up to 10 acres, and the Deed 
provided that this area could be transferred to Chrissie absolutely on the proviso that 
the local authority gave consent to its subdivision from the principle block within the 
joint lives of Ross and Chrissie.  The High Court accepted that Chrissie called for 10 
acres in 1991.  Chrissie believed the 10 acres included the camping ground and a 
larger area referred to as the “clay patch”.  In 2005 she lodged a caveat regarding her 
interest in that land, and in 2006 she applied for subdivision consent in respect to 
those 10 acres.  Consent was given but Ross refused to transfer the land to her 
because he claimed that she was only ever entitled to camping ground land.  This land 
had much less area than the 10 acres to which was referred in the Will and the Deed. 
 
Two other matters are of relevance to the appeal.  Firstly, Ross and his first wife, 
Maria, separated in 1999.  A house (known as the White House) was moved on to part 
of the 10 acres in question.  In 2004, Ross and Maria entered in to an agreement 
purporting to give Maria a life interest in the White House and the quarter acre of land 
around it.  Secondly, Ross died in 2008.  He had earlier married Vicky, the 
administrator of his estate.  Vicky lives on the principal block in the house that she 
and Ross had both occupied.  Vicky and Maria were the appellants in the appeal to the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 
 
The issues before the Court of Appeal were narrower than those before the High 
Court and included, inter alia: 1) to what area of land was Chrissie entitled; 2) what 
were the respective rights and obligations of Chrissie and Ross under the Deed; and,                                                         
1 Bethell v Bethell [2014] NZCA 442 [5 September 2014]. 
3) did Maria have an interest in the White House and the land in priority of Chrissie’s 
rights, or entitlement to any compensation.  
 
1) The Area of Land to Which Chrissie was Entitled Under the Deed 
 
Randerson J of the Court of Appeal confirmed that the High Court’s determination of 
the 10 acres in the Deed was correct, being derived from the terms of the Will.  The 
Deed and the Will should be read together as the whole purpose of the Deed was to 
modify, clarify or confirm the terms of the Will.  Whilst Courtney J, of the High 
Court, did not refer to the principles relating to the construction of a will, the Court of 
Appeal noted that the object of the Court is to ascertain the intention of the testator 
“as expressed in his or her will when read as a whole in the light of any extrinsic 
evidence admissible for the purpose of its construction.”2  The starting point is that a 
word or a phrase should be given its ordinary meaning,3 but where there is ambiguity, 
then the Court is entitled to put itself in the position of the will-maker.4  Thus, a court 
will endeavour to give effect to the will-maker’s intentions.   
 
The Court of Appeal noted that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that 
the approach for interpreting wills should be the same as that of interpreting 
commercial contracts.5  However, the Court of Appeal added that whether the case 
was approached on the basis of principles applicable to wills, or on the basis of 
principles applicable to commercial contracts, the background facts known to the 
parties at the time of the Will and the Deed were relevant.  The Court of Appeal 
determined that the 10 acres to which was referred in the Deed was intended to have 
the same meaning as the Will, thus overall the Court concluded that the Courtney J 
was right to determine that Chrissie’s entitlement was not limited to the camping 
ground, but extended up to an area of 10 acres within that vicinity.  If the Court 
deemed it necessary to go beyond the terms of the Will and the Deed, there was 
evidence that supported Chrissie’s assertions as to the 10 acres to which she was 
entitled, including witness statements and legal advice pertaining to the Deed 
referring consistently to the 10 acres.  
 
2) The Respective Rights and Obligations of Chrissie and Ross 
 
Chrissie’s rights were subject to analysis in both contractual and equitable terms.  In 
the High Court, Chrissie argued that she acquired an interest enforceable by specific 
performance, which proceeded by analogy with a claim for specific performance of an 
agreement for sale and purchase.  This was on the basis of the well-established 
principle in Attorney-General for England and Wales v R,6 where a purchaser 
acquires an equitable interest in the land if the contract is capable of being enforced 
by specific performance.  The Court of Appeal, however, whilst acknowledging that                                                         
2 At [35], referring to GE Dal Pont and KF Mackie Law of Succession (LexisNexis, Australia, 2013) at 
[8.4]; and Laws of New Zealand Wills at [164]. 
3 At [35], referring to GE Dal Pont and KF Mackie Law of Succession (LexisNexis, Australia, 2013) at 
[8.6], referring to Abbot v Middleton (1858) 7 HL Cas 68 at 114, 11 ER 28 at 46. 
4 At [35], referring to GE Dal Pont and KF Mackie Law of Succession (LexisNexis, Australia, 2013) at 
[8.39] referring to Allgood v Blake (1837) LR 8 Ex 160 at 162 (Exch) and Perrin v Morgan [1943] AC 
399 at 414 (HL). 
5 At [38] referring to Marley v Rawlings [2014] UKSC 2 at [17]-[26]. 
6 At [52] referring to Attorney-General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA) at [94]. 
Chrissie’s equitable interest depended on the analogy of an agreement for sale and 
purchase, explored a more appropriate alternative approach. 
 
The Deed was not expressed in terms of sale and purchase and cl 6(i) of the Deed did 
not require Chrissie to provide consideration.  Instead cl 6(i) simply repeated, in a 
modified fashion, the rights as a gift to which she was entitled under cl 7 or cl 8 of the 
Will.  The strict requirement for an identified parcel of land that would apply in cases 
of sale and agreement therefore was not directly applicable.  Instead, cl 6(i) showed 
that Chrissie had some choice.  Firstly, she was entitled to call for an allotment at any 
time, so long as any subdivisional approval was given in the lifetime of Ross and 
herself.  Secondly, she had a choice as to the size of the allotment.  There was nothing 
to suggest that she was required to obtain Ross’ consent as to either size or shape of 
the land for which she called.  The Court noted that it was more appropriate to take an 
approach that was more consistent with that adopted in interpreting a will.  Therefore 
Chrissie’s right to choose the final shape of the 10 acres was also supported by settled 
principles applicable to will construction, and thus by analogy, to the Deed modifying 
the Will. 
 
Ross had express and implied obligations under cl 6(i).  Regarding the express 
obligations, he was required to sign survey plans, memorandum of transfer or other 
documentation that enabled Chrissie to receive the said area subject to local authority 
approval.  Ross had implied obligations to facilitate the allocation and subdivision of 
the area up to 10 acres for when Chrissie called as the Court recognised.  This 
included the implied obligation not to do anything that would impede Chrissie from 
securing the allotment.  The obligations arose from the express terms of cl 6(i) and by 
analogy to well-understood principles in contracts for sale and purchase of land, 
including implied obligations to take reasonable steps to fulfil a conditional contract.7  
Therefore, the Court concluded that Ross breached his contractual obligations under 
the Deed.  Alternatively, a similar result followed from an analysis of his equitable 
obligations arising under the Deed.  However, Courtney J did not find it necessary to 
pursue this issue further because of the finding of breach of contract; the Court of 
Appeal concurred. 
 
In summary therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded that Chrissie’s equitable 
interest arose on the signing of the Deed in 1987, and her equitable interest was 
sufficient to support a caveat as recognised in 2005.  This provided sufficient basis to 
enable her to apply for injunctive relief should Ross attempt to sell the land or grant 
an interest in it that may have priority over Chrissie’s interest. 
 
3) Does Maria Have Any Interest in the White House and Land in Priority of 
Chrissie’s Rights/Entitlements 
 
After Ross and Maria separated, they entered in to an informal agreement, without 
legal advice, in May 2004, that gave Maria full ownership of the White House with a 
life time interest in the land of circa ¼ acre around the house, and a right of access to 
it up the existing driveway.  The Court confirmed that by virtue of s 21F of the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, the agreement was void.  Notwithstanding the Act,                                                         
7 At [64]-[65] referring to John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New 
Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2012) at [8.25] and Steele v Serepisos [2006] NZSC 67; 
[2007] 1 NZLR 1. 
the Court was satisfied that Ross had no authority to grant Maria an interest in the 
property that had priority over Chrissie’s entitlement.  In doing so, he breached his 
contractual obligations as already set out.  Therefore Maria did not have any equitable 
interest in Chrissie’s allotment that could take priority over any of Chrissie’s legal or 
equitable title to the land.  The consequence of this for Maria was that she now had no 
entitlement to occupy any part of the allotment for which Chrissie has obtained 
resource consent.  The Court also concluded that Maria has no entitlement to an 
interest in the house itself either. 
 
The Court was informed that since the house was moved on to the land, it had become 
permanently fixed to the land, which had incurred substantial costs.  The house could 
now only be moved at additional substantial costs and with difficulty.  As per the 
established principle, the Court treated this house as being part of the land in these 
circumstances.8  Counsel submitted that Chrissie would be unjustly enriched if she 
became entitled to the White House.  It was further submitted that any order for 
specific performance be made on the condition that Chrissie pay Maria compensation 
on the value of the house. 
 
The Court of Appeal concurred with Courtney J that this submission should be 
rejected.  This was because neither Maria nor Ross had any lawful right to the house.  
Further, Ross took a calculated risk when he moved the White House on to the 
property.  Maria could seek relief against the estate however.   Maria also sought 
compensation for work carried out on the White House during the period of 2010-
2013.  Courtney J rejected these claims, with which the Court of Appeal concurred.   
The reasons being that, whilst Maria and Chrissie took their respective interests in 
good faith, Maria knew of Chrissie’s claim within a relatively short period of time.  
The work on the House had been carried out when Maria knew of Chrissie’s claim to 
the land on which the White House was established and there was no established 
principle on which a claim of compensation could be based in these circumstances. 
 
Therefore in conclusion, the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal by the 
Supreme Court has brought to a close the long-running family battle for an area of 
land.  What the case has also done is confirm some well-established principles of 
succession and contract, and the application of equitable principles.  It also 
emphasises the very real importance of obtaining legal advice in relation to property 
matters, which may then go someway to help prevent a breakdown in family 
relationships. 
 
 
                                                        
8 At [87] referring to GW Hinde, DW McMorland and NR Campbell Principles of Real Property Law 
(2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) at [6.034]-[6.036]; Lockwood Buildings Ltd v Trustbank 
Canterbury Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 22 (CA). 
